The IAGS Vote and Specific Intent

I’m a wishy-washy liberal of the Stephen Fry variety—emotionally allergic to absolutism, and annoyingly attached to being precise with words, even when it gets me eye-rolls, as it often does.

Yes, yes, no one cares what an astronomer thinks about politics and it makes no difference. But it may make conversations with me easier.

So, Gaza. Here are my thoughts, dear friends, and you owe me a penny.

(Longish post, again. TLDR at the end.)

1. The IAGS resolution: what it is (and what it isn’t)

IAGS, the International Association of Genocide Scholars, recently passed a resolution calling what’s happening in Gaza a genocide. It went through a 30-day ballot and a majority of those who voted (about a ¼ of all its members) supported it. It was reported all over the media.

But : this is not a court ruling or the result of a peer-reviewed forensic investigation. IAGS membership is broad—students, activists, educators, scholars, even artists. No credential checks. You can join for as low as $30. Think of it as a professional association vote (of scholars, flutists, and flower arrangers), not an ICJ verdict. Does it carry some weight? Sure, I guess. It’s a data point with huge uncertainties. Put it there, with the rest of the data points.

2. Why I hesitate to use “genocide” (for now)

This isn’t about minimizing horror—there’s no shortage of that (and not just in Gaza).

But “genocide” has a strict legal meaning. It requires not just mass killing or cruelty, but specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy a group as such. That’s a very high evidentiary bar, and intentionally so. Not every atrocity is genocide. Not every war crime is genocide.

The ICJ has ordered provisional measures, saying the case is *plausible* under the Genocide Convention. In legal speak: “this needs scrutiny,” not “this is proven.”

3. What I condemn without hesitation

• Hamas’s October 7 massacre and hostage-taking: terrible war crimes, just horrifying.

• The massive destruction and civilian death toll in Gaza—and the absence of any serious day-after plan: also horrifying.

• Credible allegations of indiscriminate force and starvation as a weapon of war. This should alarm everyone.

• Urban warfare is messy, yes—but that does not excuse violations of the laws of war.

All of these things can and should be investigated and prosecuted under international law, without needing to “upgrade” them to genocide for moral weight.

4. Why language matters

Words don’t just describe reality, they shape it. They drive policy, diplomacy, and public opinion.

So who does it hurt if we use “genocide” a little too eagerly?

Well, for one, it risks dulling the concept. If “genocide” gets thrown around too loosely, people start to tune it out, and future victims may struggle to get recognition when the evidence truly fits.

Secondly, it risks politicization. When the term is used prematurely or sloppily, it becomes a rhetorical weapon, not a legal judgment. That can harden positions and make negotiation harder.

Thirdly, it risks backlash. If courts or independent investigations later conclude “war crimes, yes; genocide, no,” then survivors and advocates may feel doubly betrayed—first by the atrocity, then by the narrowing of the charge.

Fourthly, it risks obscuring other crimes. War crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing—these are all serious, prosecutable categories. Over-focusing on genocide can eclipse them, as though anything “less” is somehow less urgent.

On the other hand, if we are never willing to call something genocide, we risk moral cowardice and abandonment of victims.

So I try to be careful. Not timid—careful.

5. Experts don’t agree

Respected voices arguing for genocide include Raz Segal, Omer Bartov, Francesca Albanese, William Schabas, among others.

Respected voices urging caution include Menachem Rosensaft, Deborah Lipstadt, Stefan Talmon, Marko Milanovic, and others.

You may well object and dismiss some of them on this list citing various concerns, but I just mentioned them as examples, there are many more experts to be found on either side. Take your pick.

We can disagree with their conclusions, and acknowledge their individual biases, but we can’t dismiss their expertise. The fact remains that reasonable, well-meaning people, including genocide scholars, still disagree on whether the threshold has been met yet.

6. What would change my mind?

• Clearer, corroborated evidence of state-level or command-level intent to destroy a group as such.(1)

• A ruling on the merits by the ICJ or ICC.

• Independent investigations—transparent, professional, and accountable.

7. So what now?

Support a conditional ceasefire: stop the killing, release the hostages, disarm Hamas, establish security, get aid in. Not necessarily in that order. (I wrote another post on this, I won’t repeat it here.)

Let independent investigators establish the facts. That’s how we get to truth, accountability, and maybe—someday—a political resolution.

Most importantly, whatever we believe personally, ICJ and ICC rulings, when they come, will shape real-world consequences.

TLDR version:

I’m not calling it genocide right now, because that word has a specific legal meaning tied to specific intent, and I’m not convinced that threshold is met—yet. That could change.

What I am sure of is this: war crimes are happening, too many civilians are dying, and justice demands facts, not slogans.

[Your friendly neighborhood astronomer.]

1

No, not just hateful rhetoric from extremist ministers or fringe voices. Statements like those from Smotrich or Ben Gvir are abhorrent, but unless clearly tied to operational policy, they don’t meet the legal threshold for genocide. Hamas, meanwhile, has openly said October 7 will happen “again and again” until Israel is gone. Should that also count as official Palestinian policy?

Η Ισραηλινο-Παλαιστινιακή Σύγκρουση Πέρα από τις Παραδοσιακές Αφηγήσεις

Η ισραηλινο-παλαιστινιακή συζήτηση έχει παγιωθεί σε δύο ξεπερασμένες ρότες: αποτίμηση σκορ («ποιος κερδίζει;») και ηθικοί λογαριασμοί («ποιος είναι χειρότερος;»). Το εμπόδιο για την επίλυση είναι βαθύτερο και παλαιότερο. Τα δύο εθνικά κινήματα διαμορφώθηκαν στον μεταοθωμανικό αγώνα για εθνοτικά ομοιογενή κράτη, και το καθένα αντιμετωπίζει πλέον το ιδρυτικό του τραύμα ως βέτο σε οποιονδήποτε συμβιβασμό. Οι Ισραηλινοί μεταφράζουν την ανασφάλεια σε υπαρξιακή επιταγή· οι Παλαιστίνιοι αποστάζουν τον εκτοπισμό στην καρδιά της ταυτότητάς τους. 

Το παρόν δοκίμιο εξετάζει πώς η αμοιβαία άρνηση —περισσότερο απ’ ό,τι η γη ή η ιδεολογία— συντηρεί τη σύγκρουση και τι μπορεί να απαιτείται για να τερματιστεί. Η δικαιοσύνη δεν απαιτεί να αντιμετωπίζονται όλα τα μέρη ταυτόσημα, αλλά να σταθμίζονται οι επιλογές τους με βάση τις ελευθερίες, τους περιορισμούς, τις προθέσεις και τις συνέπειές τους. 

Οι σελίδες που ακολουθούν δίνουν προτεραιότητα σε τοπικές ισραηλινές και παλαιστινιακές οπτικές, όχι σε εκείνες των απομακρυσμένων διασπορών. Πολλά μένουν ανείπωτα και πολλές απόψεις δεν εκπροσωπούνται, αλλά η αφήγηση συμπυκνώνει έναν αιώνα κοινών δεινών και αποκλινόντων ελπίδων.

Χρόνος ανάγνωσης: περίπου 25 λεπτά. Χρησιμοποιήστε τον συνδεδεμένο πίνακα περιεχομένων για να μεταβείτε απευθείας σε οποιαδήποτε ενότητα. Οι πηγές δίνονται στο τέλος.

Netanyahu's gamble: Power, peril, and the narrow path between deterrence and disaster

Benjamin Netanyahu has spent the better part of the past two decades consolidating his reputation as one of the most polarizing figures in Israeli politics. His political strategy has been driven by survival instinct, tactical maneuvering, and ideological rigidity. A far-right personality, he has aligned himself with increasingly extreme elements in Israeli society and politics. The pattern is familiar: marginalise moderates, normalise extremes, consolidate power.

In the 1990s, Netanyahu stood alongside crowds that called Yitzhak Rabin a traitor for pursuing peace negotiations. His refusal to condemn extremist rhetoric helped foster the toxic climate that culminated in Rabin's assassination. In more recent years, his willingness to form coalition governments with figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, extremists by any standards, has further legitimized positions once considered fringe. Netanyahu's supporters, attempting to paint him in a more positive light, will be keen to object and point out his achievements: economic stability, technological innovation, and the Abraham Accords. But these are just side-notes on a steady push towards the authoritarian right and rising tensions. His politics consist of calculated moves aimed at preserving his grip on power, even as he remains entangled in legal and ethical scandals. 

On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Netanyahu has consistently undermined reconciliation efforts. His policies have accelerated settlement construction, eroded the possibility of a viable Palestinian state, marginalized Palestinian voices seeking avenues to compromise, and entrenched the occupation. 

His apparent strategy has been to keep the conflict unresolved but manageable, a cynical stasis in which Israel incrementally expands territorial control while avoiding the political costs of formal annexation. He has not done this unopposed, but he has succeeded in maintaining a steady background level of fear in Israeli politics by tactically weaponizing extremism. That strategy seemed to be bearing fruit - right up until October 7. In the wake of that atrocity, Israel’s usually raucous public square fell abruptly silent, and most citizens closed ranks around the government.

Under his wartime leadership, Israel has degraded Hezbollah's capabilities, compromised Houthi positions in Yemen, decapitated Hamas leadership, and inflicted devastating damage on Gaza, all without articulating a vision for the future.

A new kind of geopolitical realignment appears to be emerging. Many hawkish strategic analysts have consistently argued over the past few years that Israel’s final target must be Iran. In recent days, Israel has escalated: its air force has struck Iranian strategic assets, aiming to roll back Iran's nuclear program and destabilize the regime. Iran, for its part, is retaliating and striking Israeli territory.

A ground invasion of Iran remains extremely unlikely. Not only because there is no domestic or international will to support it, given the daunting logistics, but because such a move would galvanize nationalist support for the Iranian regime and turn domestic unrest into patriotic defense, just as happened in Israel after October 7. Netanyahu seems to understand this. The U.S. does too. Despite the rhetoric about preparing for a long campaign, he might instead be gambling on a shorter window: degrade Iran's regional posture, compromise its military capabilities, destabilize its internal politics, and encourage an uprising. 

Moreover, public support in Israel for a prolonged confrontation, one that goes beyond setting back Iran’s nuclear ambitions, is relatively moderate to weak, and time does not appear to be working in Netanyahu’s favour, given how a prolonged confrontation can completely destabilize the entire region and lead to all out war. That is his gamble. This is why he is constantly messaging the Iranian people to seize the opportunity.

And here lies the paradox, and history’s irony: if everything aligns just right, and that is a monumental if, Netanyahu may go down in history not just as the deeply divisive figure that he is, but as someone who reshaped the Middle East. The same man who sabotaged the two-state solution, discredited the Palestinian Authority, and deepened fear and division could one day be seen as having cleared away the region’s most persistent external obstacles, and helped dismantle the Islamist axis. The man who brought about the conditions for peace. That could well be the redemption story he tells himself.

This of course all hinges on elements outside Netanyahu’s control: the readiness of the Iranian people to seize the moment, the restraint of regional powers, and the containment of escalation. And that would be one of history’s darker ironies: a legacy not born of wisdom, vision, or moral courage, but of unintended consequence.

But is Netanyahu’s gamble likely to pay off? Most Iranians don’t like their government but they are no friends of Israel either. Netanyahu’s calls to rise up may well be interpreted not as a call to freedom but as a call to assist Israel in its attacks, a call to treason. Moderate Iranians whose daily peace has been disturbed and who witness the devastation are more likely to side with their government, even though they don’t like it. There is a significant Iranian diaspora that hate the regime and are very loud. But however legitimate their grievances and protests, they are not reliable indicators of feelings on the ground  - and the Iranian people are fiercely patriotic. 

Reza Pahlavi is the single best-known opposition face and a rallying symbol for Iranian reformists, but there is little evidence that he commands substantial support within Iran, at least not on the scale that would be needed to turn the tables on the regime. The gamble is therefore extremely risky and equally likely to backfire.

If the conflict drags on and after the two sides become exhausted, something else might materialize entirely. A second possibility is that the devastation may force the clerics to rethink their long-term strategy in order to maintain their grip on power: tone down the rhetoric, rein-in the extremism, and reach out with greater resolve trying to smooth relationships with the West in order to lift sanctions. After all, Russia and China had only words to offer but no material support in the conflict. Iran has been left alone. The pain to the Iranian people and the regime itself is palpable. The costs of isolation are too high to maintain indefinitely. But the fundamentalist and oppressive nature of the regime isn’t likely to change in any meaningful way.

And then there is a third possibility. Iran might harden their stance, pull out of the non-proliferation treaty, as they are already threatening to do, and aim to quickly go full nuclear. And the catastrophe that would follow such a decision would be on a different scale altogether.

References:

Poll shows half of Israelis back Iran strike without U.S. support.

GAMAAN. “Iranians’ Attitudes Toward Political Systems.” March 2022 survey (p. 1-2).

Ben-Gvir and Smotrich sanctioned for incitement to violence.

Iran threatens to leave non-proliferation treaty

IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear facilities, section D.

EU External Action Service. 2023 Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, August 2024.

UN OCHA. Humanitarian Situation Update #296 (Gaza), 11 June 2025.

The Great Misinterpretation: How Palestinians View Israel - Haviv Rettig Gur

This is a good lecture about some of the less discussed aspects of the history of Zionism and the historical development of the Palestinian perspective. Haviv Rettig Gur is political correspondent and senior analyst for The Times of Israel.