In the latest The Rest Is Politics podcast, Rory Stewart and Alastair Campbell had Yanis Varoufakis as a guest.
Varoufakis is charismatic, articulate, quick, funny, and very good at weaving complex economic arguments into simple moral stories. He often speaks as if the fog has lifted, everything is obvious, and everyone else is either confused, cowardly, compromised, or secretly agrees with him.
The episode presented him, implicitly at least, as a well-meaning Cassandra: the economist who warned Europe that austerity would fail, was ignored by unimaginative technocrats, and was later proved right. Ok, there is some truth in that. The Greek bailout architecture was flawed. Greece’s debt dynamics were unsustainable. Austerity in a collapsing economy was destructive. Even the IMF later acknowledged serious failures in the original Greek programme, including delayed debt restructuring, over-optimistic assumptions, and inadequate attention to the politics of adjustment.
But that is only one part of the story.
The real question is not simply whether Varoufakis was right about austerity and the creditors were wrong. The harder question is whether his own strategy in 2015 was credible, responsible, and safe for the Greek people. Greece was insolvent and illiquid without official support. There were no easy solutions.
There is a serious tension between Varoufakis the co-author of A Modest Proposal for Resolving the Eurozone Crisis and Varoufakis the finance minister in 2015.
The earlier proposal, written with Stuart Holland and James Galbraith, was a serious eurozone reform plan. It called for bank recapitalisation through European mechanisms, limited debt conversion, investment-led recovery through the EIB and EIF, and emergency social solidarity measures. It was Keynesian in spirit, but institutionally cautious. It tried to work through existing European institutions and avoided presenting itself as a Grexit manual.
Varoufakis argued convincingly that the eurozone had created a dangerous structure: monetary union without proper fiscal union, national banking crises tied to sovereign debt crises, and creditor discipline without sufficient investment or democratic accountability. Much of what was in that proposal made sense.
But once in office, his posture changed. The 2015 strategy he actually pursued was much more confrontational. It relied on outright rejecting the old bailout logic, threatening default, and forcing Europe to choose between accepting debt restructuring or risking Greek collapse. That strategy might have had more leverage in 2010 or 2011, when European banks were far more exposed to Greece and the eurozone firewalls were weaker. By 2015, the wider euro-area financial system had been largely protected. Greek default would still have been serious, but the immediate damage would have fallen mainly on Greece itself.
That is a key point the interview did not pursue. Varoufakis appears to have treated Grexit, or at least Greek default, as a threat the creditors would not dare allow. By 2015, they were actually much more willing to call the bluff.
Being right about the dangers of debt and austerity does not make brinkmanship with Greek banks, pensions, deposits, imports, and salaries a responsible strategy. It was clear to everyone that some fiscal adjustment was unavoidable. The easily defensible criticism of the creditor programme is that the timing, scale, composition, and lack of early debt restructuring made the adjustment far more destructive than it needed to be.
The interview should have pressed him on the obvious questions. What exactly was the fallback plan if the banks collapsed? How would a parallel payment system have operated? How would pensioners have been paid? How would medicines and imports have been protected? How would deposits have been defended? Was this a credible Plan B, or a way of making rupture sound more controlled than it really was?
Rory and Alastair should also have challenged his claim that people such as Lagarde and Draghi agreed with him. Many serious economists and officials eventually accepted that Greek debt was unsustainable and that Europe’s austerity-heavy approach was badly designed. But accepting the need for debt relief is not the same as endorsing Varoufakis’s tactics, his reading of creditor incentives, or his Plan B. He often turns partial vindication on debt sustainability into much broader vindication of his overall conduct.
In conversation, Varoufakis can often sound pragmatic and common-sensical. But his writings and politics point to a more radical political agenda. He is not merely arguing for reforms, higher taxes and better regulation of capitalism. He has described himself as a Marxist of sorts, has said that capitalism and democracy are structurally incompatible, developed a theory of “technofeudalism,” and proposed radical changes to corporate ownership, finance, digital platforms, and money. One can agree or disagree with that agenda, but it should have been made more visible.
Alastair could have challenged him from the centre-left: yes, austerity was destructive; yes, Greece needed debt relief; yes, the eurozone was badly designed. But why risk a banking collapse without a durable majority, a credible coalition in Europe, and a tested administrative plan?
Rory could have challenged him from the centre-right: if you talk about parallel liquidity, fiscal money, or a public payment system that can be converted into a new drachma, why would depositors keep their money in Greek banks? Why would investors trust the state? How do you protect contracts, pensions, small businesses, and property rights during such uncertainty?
The Greek crisis was complicated, divisive, and deeply damaging. Varoufakis wasn't simply one brave economist facing a room full of cruel technocrats, as he likes to present himself. The important story here is about weak leverage, institutional constraints, political miscalculation, bank runs, default risk, and the dangers of turning economic theory into negotiating theatre.
The missed opportunity in this episode was that Rory and Alastair seemed too impressed by the performance and not sceptical enough of the narrative.
Being right about austerity is not a license to gamble with rupture.
Maybe they'll push him more in a future episode.