Friday, 28 November 2025

Criticism and Bigotry


It has been disturbing to witness how fast people slip into essentialising entire populations.    

As if millions of different lives, traumas and moral choices could be poured into a single bucket and given a label. That is neither true justice nor genuine solidarity. It is surrender to the cruder parts of the self that prefer simplistic fairy tales with well-defined villains and heroes, instead of dealing with the far messier reality.   

Not all conflicts are symmetrical, power imbalances exist, and the human cost of conflict is not evenly distributed. Acknowledging those realities, and the responsibilities they imply, is a necessary part of any honest reckoning.

Taking a stand to defend what one believes in is a deeply personal moral choice. It is entirely possible to do this in a way that does not require erasure of identity, that still recognises the human element on each side.    

Bigotry that hides behind a supposed concern for justice uses the language and tools of humanitarianism to justify blind hatred. It often dresses itself up as moral clarity, but what it really asks for is moral permission to stop making distinctions, to stop doing the hard work of seeing the complexity of intent, to turn whole peoples into an undifferentiated enemy. It uses the brutish language of delegitimisation and exclusion instead of that of understanding and bridge-building. It usurps and twists terminology to fit its own narrative.    

The moment it becomes normal to talk about entire populations as inherently cruel, bloodthirsty or untrustworthy, those on the other side of the divide start to appear as less than human. The worried parent who wants their children to be safe fades from view. So does the dissident who risks their life to call out their own side, and the activist who looks beyond the pain for workable solutions without demonising the other side, and is called naive at best or a traitor at worst. At some point, erasing the humanity of “them” requires suppressing it in oneself.      

This is not solely an appeal to conscience; it is also a recognition of consequence. The language in which a conflict is framed, and the rigor with which standards are demanded from one’s own side, as well as the other, are what determine the horizon of actions that will later be regarded as acceptable once victory is achieved. 

If “they” are monolithically evil, if “they” are darkness incarnate, then there is nothing to negotiate with and nothing to build with. There is only permanent conflict. If every Israeli is a settler-colonialist, every Palestinian a terrorist supporter, every Russian a bloodthirsty fascist and every American a greedy imperialist, then history becomes a prison of clashing foundational myths instead of a pool of common human experience from which to draw helpful lessons.

Rejecting this way of thinking does not require us to pretend that responsibility never extends beyond a few bad apples. States, armies, movements, parties and sometimes even the majority of a population can be implicated in systems that perpetuate injustice and violence. We can and should talk about the responsibility of institutions and majorities without sliding into the obscene claim that every person of a particular nationality is equally guilty, or that guilt is an inherited essence that clings to whole bloodlines and to any government, past, present or future, that claims to act in their name. The former is earnest criticism, the latter is bigotry. 

This narrow path that avoids collective demonization is not one of moral blindness. It requires naming atrocities for what they are, including those from one’s own side. It allows pointing to specific leaders, heads of movements, generals and soldiers and saying: this is criminal, this is unacceptable, this needs to stop. It allows demanding that the perpetrators of atrocities be brought to justice. It allows principled resistance, advocacy for remedial action, and insistence on accountability. And it does so without turning entire peoples into cartoon villains. Grief is still possible without constructing an object of pure hatred, without giving in to moral absolutism.    

Raw grief and anger and fear will sometimes speak in generalisations. A person who has experienced tremendous loss and doesn’t yet know what to do with the pain will often be consumed by desperation and rage. This is human. It is understandable. But allowing that moment of understandable rage to harden into a permanent identity, to mold an entire worldview, that is when rage turns into abject hatred and begins to demand victims.

To escape the cycle of endless trauma, it is necessary to continuously and consciously resist the temptation to reduce whole peoples to the worst things that have been done in their name. Convictions can be held while still entertaining the possibility of uncertainty, and remaining open to revising perspectives when new information comes to light. Dialogue can remain open with those who approach in honest interest and, to a limited extent, even with those who are absolute, if only to clarify the boundaries of tolerance. If this principle has any value, it also means actively refusing to be trapped in echo chambers. 

The fact that it feels so easy to hate these days is not evidence that the hateful narratives are true. It is evidence of how easy radicalisation has become.


Being

Being wise also means recognizing what a rare occurrence life is in the universe; and therefore, how precious. 

Being good also means that you always recognize a remote human possibility, even in your worst enemies.

Being brave also means that you are ready to stand your ground against those that would destroy people, things, ideas and principles that you value dearly. But recognizing that you do so out of necessity. Because the circumstances demand it, not out of hatred. 

Being kind also means that you understand that vengeance is a snake eating its tail, and that the important thing is to prevent those that would do harm from being able to act on it. 

Being empathetic also means recognizing the frailty of life, that people carry invisible scars, and so you try to temper your language with civility. But when civility is weaponized against you, you draw a line and hold it, because empathy does not mean naivety.

Understanding what it means to live in a liberal democracy, you expect, and even celebrate, the free expression and clash of ideas. Because you see it as the most effective way to identify flaws, quickly and efficiently, in this ever-developing system, so that you can then work to correct them. You see this clearly as the only reliable path to improvement and a healthier democracy.

Being a good citizen is also an ongoing exercise in prudence, patience and tolerance. It means you are willing to listen, to understand, and to see clearly the futility of battling paper tigers.

But some of us are none of those things.

Saturday, 1 November 2025

Παραμυθάκι για το Σαββατοκύριακο

 Παραμυθάκι για το Σαββατοκύριακο

ΜΙΑ ΦΟΡΑ ΚΙ ΕΝΑΝ ΚΑΙΡΟ… σε ένα παράλληλο σύμπαν …

…στα χρόνια του Μεγάλου Μανιτού, όταν ακόμη τα ποτάμια ψιθύριζαν ιστορίες και τα βουνά τραγουδούσαν με τον άνεμο, ζούσε ένας λαός εύθυμος, με καρδιά μεγάλη σαν τον ορίζοντα, και με καπνά διαλογής. Τη γη τους την έλεγαν Χελώνεια Νήσο, γιατί πίστευαν πως μια μαγκούφα Μεγάλη Χελώνα κουβαλούσε όλη τη δημιουργία στην πλάτη της. 

Που λέτε παιδιά, ο χρόνος εκεί κυλούσε ήσυχα, με γιορτές, με τελετές, με μέτρημα των φύλλων των εποχών, και με καμία ανθρωποθυσία για να περνάει διασκεδαστικά η ώρα και για να κλάψει ο ουρανός και να χαρεί η φύση. Μαλώνανε, αγκαλιαζόντουσαν και τα ξαναβρίσκανε, και γενικά γελούσανε και κλαίγανε για τα ίδια πράγματα που γελάει και κλαίει ο κόσμος σε όλη την υφήλιο. Όλα καλά.

Μιά μέρα κάτι χλωμά πρόσωπα ήρθαν εξ ανατολάς σε ξύλινα καράβια μακρομούτσουνα. Φτιάξανε κάτι ξύλινα χωριά περίεργα και αρχίσανε να καλλιεργούν τη γή (άκουσον άκουσον) αντί να κυνηγούν βίσωνες όπως κάθε σοβαρός άνθρωπος, αλλά τελικά δέν τα βρήκανε με τους ντόπιους, οι οποίοι τους πετάξανε πίσω στη θάλασσα να πάν απο κεί που ήρθαν. Έτσι πάει. 

Πέρασαν πολλά χρόνια, και τα χλωμά πρόσωπα, άλλα χλωμά πρόσωπα αυτά, ξαναπήγαν. 

Χαλόου όλ γιου πίπλ! Χάβ γιου χέρντ οφ άουρ λόρντ Τζίζους Κράιστ;

Οι ξύλινες πιρόγες τους ήταν τεράσιες αυτή τη φορά. Οι ντόπιοι έκλασαν μέντες σαν αντίκρισαν τα σιδερένια τσουτσούνια τους. Ήρθαν που λέτε τα χλωμά πρόσωπα, στρώθηκαν, και γνώρισαν και στους ντόπιους τις ξαδέρφες τους, την Ιλαρά και την Ευλογιά, που κυριολεκτικά τους πέταξαν τα μάτια έξω. Αργότερα φέρανε και κάποια μαύρα πρόσωπα σε αλυσίδες, αλλά αυτό είναι άλλο παραμύθι για άλλη φορά.

Αυτά τα χλωμά πρόσωπα που λέτε παιδιά, δέν μασούσαν κάστανα, και τα ήθελαν όλα εδώ και τώρα. Πλακωθήκανε χοντρά με τους ντόπιους και οι ντόπιοι φάγανε τόσο πολύ ξύλο, που πήγαν να κρυφτούν όπου μπορούσαν. Καμιά φορά, οι πιό ριψοκίνδυνοι απο τους ντόπιους, σήκωναν χέρι και πετούσαν κανένα κοτρόνι στα χλωμά πρόσωπα, ή τους έπιαναν και τους κούρευαν, αλλά ότι και να έκαναν, δέν άλλαζε τίποτα. Τζάμπα κόπος.

Τελικά, για να μη πολυλογώ, τα χλωμά πρόσωπα κατάφεραν να ξεκάνουν τους περισσότερους ντόπιους. Μερικοί παραδόθηκαν άνευ όρων και μείνανε μίζεροι και απομονωμένοι σε μικρά χωριά να θυμούνται και να κλαίνε τη μοίρα τους. Οι περισσότεροι όμως σήκωσαν πανιά και την κοπάνησαν πέρα απ τη θάλασσα, σε μέρη άγνωστα, και βρήκαν καταφύγιο σε άλλες χώρες. Χώρες όπου δεν τους ήθελαν, τους έλεγαν κοκκινομούρηδες, τους έδειχναν στα καρναβάλια, τους φορούσαν καπέλα με φτερά, αλλά που τουλάχιστον δέν τρώγαν φάπες τόσο συχνα όσο τις έτρωγαν στο σπίτι τους. Έτσι πάει. 

Και το πάθημα γίνεται μάθημα, άν έχεις δύο δράμια μυαλό.

Και πέρασαν τα χρόνια… πολλάααα χρόνια …

...και τα χλωμά πρόσωπα φτιάξανε μια Αυτοκρατορία μεγάλη, ναααα! Τόσο μεγάλη, που νόμιζαν ότι θα ζήσει χίλια χρόνια, όπως όλοι οι σαρδανάπαλοι που δεν σκαμπάζουν από Ιστορία. Και χτίζανε ουρανοξύστες που ξύναν τα οπίσθια του ουρανού, στέλνανε ανθρώπους στο φεγγάρι να μαζέψουν τυρί, μά τον Μανιτού!, και βάζανε και παρδαλή σημαία, έτσι για ενθύμιο οτι γαμ**ν και δέρνουν και τα λοιπά, και τα λοιπά. Έτσι πάει, και να μου συγχωρήσετε τα Γαλλικά.

Τέλος πάντων, για να μη σας τα πολυλογώ παιδία μου, οι αυτοκρατορίες που λέτε, κάποια στιγμή γίνονται τοξικές, και μετά αρχίζουν να λιώνουν σαν παγωτό τον Αύγουστο. Οι φτωχοί φώναζαν και πεινούσαν, οι πλούσιοι βαριόντουσαν και έτρωγαν παντεσπάνι, κι οι μικρομεσαίοι βλέπανε Netflix και βρίζονταν στα σοσιαλμύδια.

 Έ, και κάποια στιγμή που λέτε άρχισαν να πλακώνονται όλοι αναμετάξυ των, και απο το πολύ το ξύλο, κλάταρε η χώρα στην οποία είχαν έρθει οι παππούδες τους ώς σιδηροτσούτσουνοι κατακτητές, και που τώρα ήταν πλέον και δική τους, και τα κοράκια τριγύρω άρχισαν να τους λιμπίζονται και να ζωγραφίζουν γραμμές σε χάρτες. Έτσι πάει.

Και σε όλη αυτή την αναμπουμπούλα, ο μεγάλος σαμάνος, το Φαλακρό Γεράκι του Βουνού, κάλεσε ένα πάου-γουάου, όπου παρευρέθηκαν όλοι οι αρχηγοί απο τις τέσσερις γωνιές του κόσμου, που όμως δέν είναι ούτε τέσσερις, ούτε γωνίες. Όπως ούτε αυτό το παραμύθι είναι ακριβώς παραμύθι. Και η συζήτηση πήγε κάπως έτσι:

-Φαλακρό Γεράκι του Βουνού (ΦΓΒ): Πώ!!! Παίδες είδατε τί παίζει;

-Φίδι στον Κόρφο Σου (ΦΚΣ): Άσε, φιλαράκι, άσε!

-Ηχώ της Κραυγής που Άφησε σάν Πάτησε Ακίδα Καθώς η Μάνα του Γαργάριζε Εύθυμα Δίπλα στο Ποτάμι (ΗΚΑΠΑΚΜΦΕΔΠ): Παίδες, τα πράγματα δέν πάνε καθόλου καλά εδώ που είμαστε! Έχουν αρχίσει να μας την πέφτουν πανταχόθεν. Χθές μας είχαν πάρει πάλι με τις φάπες και χάσαμε το Μικρό Κυκλάμινο και το ψάχνουμε εδώ και βδομάδες.

-ΦΓΒ: Ναί μωρέ, κι εδώ τα ίδια, έρχεται μεγάλη μπόρα. Ζήσαμε εδώ όσο ζήσαμε αλλά ίσως είναι καιρός να σκεφτούμε να γυρίσουμε σπίτι.

-Μαλ**** του Χωριού (ΜΤΧ): Ναί! Μά το μεγάλο Μανιτού! Το Μεγάλο Πνεύμα πάντα προόριζε τη γή αυτή για τη φυλή μας. Μεγάλη η χάρη του!

-Όλοι μαζί: Σκάσε ρε συ! Μιλάμε σοβαρά εδώ.

-(ΜΤΧ, ψιθυριστά): Καλάαααα, τα ξαναλέμε σε μερικές δεκαετίες.

-ΦΓΒ: Λοιπόν, συμφωνούμε όλοι, πάμε πίσω στα πάτρια;

-ΗΚΑΠΑΚΜΦΕΔΠ: Μισό! Γιατί δεν πάμε στη Φουγκάντα; Εκεί θα είμαστε τουλάχιστον ασφαλείς. Για πολύ καιρό. Νομίζω. Δεν ξέρω δηλαδή, λέω τώρα, αλλά, έ.

-ΦΓΒ: Δεν είναι κακή ιδέα. Να το συζητήσουμε. (Δυνατά) Ποιός θέλει να μαζέψουμε λεφτά να πάμε στη Φουγκάντα, να αναψει τώρα την πίπα του. … … … 

-ΦΓΒ: Δέν βλέπω καπνό. … Ποιός θέλει να επιστρέψουμε σπίτι;

-Όλοι μαζί: ΠΟΥΦ ΠΟΥΦ ΠΟΥΦ ΓΚΟΥΧ

- ΦΚΣ: Άν πάμε δεν τα βλέπω καλά τα πράγματα. Δέν θα μας θέλουν ούτε εκεί. Πρέπει να είμαστε έτοιμοι για κάθε ενδεχόμενο…

-ΦΓΒ: Ναί ρέ, κλασικά. Πουθενά δε μας θέλουν. Τουλάχιστον ας είμαστε σπίτι μας κι ας μη μας θέλουν τα χλωμά πρόσωπα. Ίσως αλλάξουν τα πράγματα, θα δούμε. Θα πρέπει να κάνουμε όμως συμβιβασμούς. Στη χειρότερη θα πέσει ξύλο.

Έτσι που λέτε παιδιά μου άρχισε η επιστροφή αυτού του βασανισμένου λαού. Μάζεψαν λεφτά και άρχισαν να μισθώνουν πλοία και να γυρνάνε. Λίγοι στην αρχή, περισσότεροι αργότερα όταν τα πράγματα άρχισαν να γίνονται πολύ δύσκολα. Και κουβάλησαν μαζί τους τις γλώσσες των τόπων που έζησαν και την κληρονομιά τους που ποτέ δεν ξέχασαν. Ήρθαν με τα παιδιά τους, με βιβλία, με τσουγκράνες, με τραύματα, με όνειρα.

 Άρχισαν να αγοράζουν γή και να την καλλιεργούν. Τα χλωμά πρόσωπα ταράχτηκαν.

-Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #1 Μα καλά, ξαναγυρνάνε αυτοί; Δεν μας φτάνουν αυτοί οι κουρέληδες που έχουμε ήδη στους καταυλισμούς τους;

-Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #2 Και τί θέλουν δηλαδή; Χώρα λέει;! Καλά, πάνε καλά; Πού νομίζουν ότι έρχονται;

-Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #3 Κάτι για ένα παππού τους λένε και για έναν Μανιτού. Τί είναι αυτός; Τσίζους πάντως δέν είναι.

-Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #4 Και ποιος τους έδωσε την άδεια; Ξενόφερτοι! Εμείς ζούμε εδώ. Δικός μας είναι ο τόπος.

Κι στο τσουπ-τσουρέκι, τους φόρεσαν το ταμπελάκι "νεο-κατακτητές".

- Εκπρόσωπος των Επιστρεφόντων (ΕΤΕ):  Ρε σείς, ώπα. Χόλντ γιόρ χόρσες,που λέτε κι εσείς εδώ. Θα τα βρούμε κάπως. Η αυτοκρατορία διαλύεται. Φτιάχτε εσείς όσες χώρες θέλετε, όπως τις θέλετε, θα φτιαξουμε κι εμείς μια μικρή χώρα για μας, στους πατρογονικούς τόπους μας. Κι όσους δικούς μας θέλουν να φύγουν απο τα χωριά τους, όπου κι άν είναι, θα τους πάρουμε. Κι όσοι από σάς θέλετε να μείνετε, θα τα βρούμε κάπως, αλλά εμείς θα κάνουμε τους δικούς μας νόμους γιατί στα σύνορα της μικρής μας χώρας που θέλουμε να κάνουμε, είμαστε πιά πλειοψηφία. Κι όσοι λίγοι απο μάς θέλουν να παραμείνουν στα καταλύματά τους στις δικές σας χώρες, να τους μεριμνήσετε, όπως κι εμείς τα χλωμά πρόσωπα που θα ζούν στη χώρα μας. Εντάξει; Ντίλ;

- Άρχοντες των Χλωμών Προσώπων (ΑΧΠ): Με καμία δύναμη λέμε! Θα κάτσετε στις δικές μας νέες χώρες και θα αποφασίζουμε εμείς για σας. Δέν θα κάνετε δική σας χώρα στη γή μας.

- ΕΤΕ:Ορίστε; Στη γή σας;

- ΑΧΠ: Ναί ρε! Στη γή μας! Να πάτε πίσω στις χώρες απ’όπου ήρθατε. Άσταδιαλα.

- ΕΤΕ: Καλά, πάμε πρώτα μια βόλτα απ’τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη, που έχουν έρθει για καφέ, να δούμε τι θα πούν κι αυτοί;

- ΑΧΠ: Πάμε, αλλά ότι και να πούν, στα τέτοια μας.

- Ηνωμένα Έθνη: Χάλοου ντάρλινγκς. Φτιάξτε χώρες όσες θέτε και η μια θα είναι για τους επιστρέφοντες, αυτό είναι το σωστό, αλλά να είστε όλοι αγαπημένοι και να μη μαλώνετε. Εμείς φεύγουμε, καλή τύχη.

- ΕΤΕ:Οκ, έγινε, φτιάξαμε χώρα. Να σταματήσουμε να μαλώνουμε τώρα και θα τα βρούμε κάπως.

- ΑΧΠ: Τώρα θα φάτε καλά! Πόλεμος! Θα σας πετάξουμε στη θάλασσα!

(Λίγο αργότερα …) 

- Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #1: Ώχ, μας πετάξανε στη θάλασσα οι καρμίρηδες. 

- Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #2: Και τώρα δεν μας δέχονται πίσω. Πώπω, καταστροφή. Χάσαμε τα σπίτια μας. 

-Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #3: Ούτε οι διπλανοί που φτιάξαν κράτη μας θέλουν. Και τώρα; 

-Χλωμό Πρόσωπο #4: Έ, μια στραβή ήταν, θα τους γα**σουμε! Τους αποικιοκράτες, τους νεο-κατακτητές, αυτοί φταίνε για όλα. Ο Τσίζους είναι μαζί μας, κατά τας γραφάς. Πάμε άλλη μία… 

Κι έτσι που λέτε καλά μου παιδιά είχανε στο περίπου τα πράγματα.

Και ζήσανε αυτοί σκ*τά κι εμείς καλύτερα. 

Προς το παρόν.


Saturday, 13 September 2025

You Keep Using That Word: 'Settler-Colonial'



There’s a fashionable framework, imported from Western academia, that likes to slap the label “settler-colonialism” onto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It’s tidy. It’s ideological. And I think it’s about as accurate as seeing the starving Irish who fled the Great Famine and washed up in Boston as nefarious agents of the British Empire. I’m exaggerating of course, but humor me while we explore it.

Originally, this concept was invoked to describe real imperial expansions: British Australia, the American frontier, apartheid South Africa. There’s a metropole that sends its people to settle, extract, dominate, and, when circumstances call, eliminate. Land is taken. Natives are displaced and/or killed. Wealth flows to the imperial center. Sometimes resistance eventually uproots the settlers and the metropole is forced to concede and withdraw, as happened with the French in Algeria. Other times, the settler colony breaks from the metropole and a new nation is born. That’s the model.

Apply it wholesale to Israel and you get a narrative that’s sufficiently complex and emotionally satisfying, but one that’s historically problematic. Worse still, it doesn’t just misread the past; it actively undermines the present, narrowing the prospects for resolution by flattening a tragic clash of national movements into a one-dimensional morality play. And beneath its righteous surface, it carries a neo-colonially racist logic, one that erases Palestinian agency, casting them as passive objects of history rather than political actors in their own right.

Ok, so let’s walk through this ugly mess together, slowly.


1. No metropole

The first red flag is the absence of an empire calling the shots. In traditional settler colonies, the motherland pulls the strings. But in the case of Zionism, there is no “motherland.” Jews didn’t arrive in Palestine as imperial agents. They were dodging pogroms, fleeing the ashes of Europe, observing the collapse of the Ottoman empire. British policy first approved but then restrained Jewish immigration, culminating in the 1939 White Paper, which slammed the gates shut on Europe’s Jews right as the Holocaust loomed. Not exactly a ringing endorsement of colonial backing.

By 1947, the British were forcibly turning back refugee ships and sending Holocaust survivors back to camps in Germany. Look up or Google the Exodus affair.

The idea that Israel is a colony is not just wrong; it’s grotesquely weaponized to serve a particular narrative. It ignores that Jews were stateless and often unwelcome even where they lived. They weren’t exporting empires. They were clawing for survival.


2. Not an invasion

What makes Israel particularly complicated is that the Jews weren’t strangers to this land. The historical memory runs deep: Jerusalem, Judea, the Second Temple. These are words with deep meaning that have been the cornerstone of Jewish identity for millennia. The land is littered with monuments of ancient Jewish civilization. Yes, Muslim ones too, and Christian. History is layered, one does not negate the other.

Yes, many Zionists came from Europe. But many more came later from Baghdad, Fez, Aleppo, and Cairo, fleeing Arab nationalism or Islamic backlash. These weren't conquistadors in fancy hats. They were also refugees.

Ok, here’s a thought experiment: Imagine if the Native Americans were exiled from their lands, scattered across the world and persecuted for centuries. All the while keeping their traditions and historical memory alive. And then returned. Not as conquerors, but as a people trying to re-establish a homeland in their ancestral lands during an opportune global moment of imperial collapse and national reawakening. Would you call it “settler-colonialism”?

The re-emergence of Jewish desire for sovereignty happened in parallel with Arab, Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish national movements while the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating. But it was not driven by the same forces. It was primarily driven by the realization and urgency of rising hostility in the lands where they had lived for centuries, always as outsiders. Not every national movement succeeded. Some clashed. Some bled. But none of them fit cleanly into the settler-colonial mold. Including this one.


3. “A land without a people”?

One enduring myth is that Zionists saw Palestine as empty. That is not true. Some early pamphlets were naive and romanticized, but serious Zionist leaders knew otherwise and wrestled with the implications. Ahad Ha’am, in 1891, warned that Arabs “see and understand what we are doing.” Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” (1923) assumed Arab resistance, not erasure, and argued that only when Jews were seen as permanent would moderates agree to concessions. He saw a path to coexistence:

"Not till then will they drop their extremist leaders whose watchword is 'Never!' And the leadership will pass to the moderate groups, who will approach us with a proposal that we should both agree to mutual concessions. Then we may expect them to discuss honestly practical questions, such as a guarantee against Arab displacement, or equal rights for Arab citizens, or Arab national integrity. And when that happens, I am convinced that we Jews will be found ready to give them satisfactory guarantees, so that both peoples can live together in peace, like good neighbours."

Before 1947, there were no mass expulsions, no destroyed villages, no Nakba. Jews and Arabs lived in uneasy coexistence, fractured by violence. Much of that violence fell on Jews: the Jerusalem riots of 1920, the Jaffa riots of 1921, the massacres in Hebron and Safed in 1929. During the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, hundreds of Jews were killed, and Jewish militias retaliated in kind. Bloody episodes, yes, but not a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Until the British imposed restrictions in 1939, much of the land was purchased legally, often from absentee landlords, though some Arab tenants were displaced. Not seized. Not looted. That distinction matters because it speaks to intent.

By 1937, in the midst of the Arab Revolt, the British Peel Commission proposed partition as a compromise: one state Jewish (about 17% of Mandate Palestine), one state Arab (the rest, minus a British corridor around Jerusalem). The Zionist leadership was bitterly divided; many had hoped for more, but the Congress authorized continued negotiations, albeit reluctantly. The Arab Higher Committee unanimously rejected it outright. They refused any division that included Jewish sovereignty and proposed instead an independent Arab state, with protections for the Jewish minority, while demanding a halt to Jewish immigration and a stop to land sales. Two years later, the British White Paper slammed the gates, just as some Arab leaders, most notoriously the exiled Grand Mufti, began aligning with Nazi Germany.


4. 1947–49: The war, the flight, the catastrophe(s)

As Britain prepared to abandon the Mandate in 1947, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin summed it up in Parliament: “His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles… For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish state. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine.”

Britain washed its hands of the Mandate, passing the question to the UN. Resolution 181 was another shot at compromise: partition again. Two states. The Jewish Agency accepted. Arab leaders rejected it outright and mobilized. In May 1948, five Arab armies, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the nascent state of Israel, because any form of independent Jewish state was unacceptable.

What followed was catastrophe. For Palestinians, the Nakba. Some 700,000 people displaced, hundreds of villages depopulated. But also for Jews across the Arab world, who were expelled or fled en masse. Around 800,000 of them. Hundreds of thousands ended up in Israel, swelling its population with people who had no European passports, no foreign motherland, no “metropole” to lean on.

If all of these people were “settlers,” they were the strangest kind: persecuted, stateless, homeless, and broken.


5. The framing that blocks the solution

And this, perhaps, is the most damning thing about the settler-colonial framing: it makes peace impossible.

Because if Israel is a colonial project, then the only acceptable “solution” is its dismantling. No partition. No recognition. No compromise. Just return and reversal.

That may feel righteous to some, but every serious peace effort, whether Clinton in 2000, Geneva in 2003, or Olmert–Abbas in 2008, was built on mutual recognition, reparations, land-swaps, and partition. Two states, not “decolonization”.

An obvious objection is that this isn’t about erasure, but about equality and universalism: one democratic state, no state religion, equal rights for all. What’s the problem?

The problem is that this vision demands the end of Jewish self-determination, dressed in the language of liberal principle. It imagines decades of war, trauma, and clashing national identities can be resolved by folding everyone into a single, post-national flag. But “equality” that abolishes one people’s independence isn’t peace. It’s rejectionism dressed up in respectable clothing.

The maximalist return narrative necessarily obliterates Jewish self-determination and guarantees permanent conflict. It’s a morality tale that celebrates continued rejectionism and subverts any hope for what Palestinians themselves have long demanded: an independent Palestinian state.


6. Not invaders, not demons, but no saints either

None of this is to say Israel is faultless. It isn’t. Occupation corrodes. Nationalism blinds. And yes, historical trauma can become a blunt weapon if not examined honestly. Israel also has a lot to answer for and continuously wrestles with its identity.

But if we want to talk seriously about peace, we have to understand what this conflict is *not*. It is *not* a replay of white settlers landing on native shores in the name of Queen and Country. It is *not* a story of Europeans extracting value from foreign soil.

It’s a story of two peoples, each with competing historical claims and wounds, colliding in the same space at the same time. One returning, one rooted. One exiled, one present. Both now native. Both scarred. Both stuck. And increasingly radicalized.


Bottom line?

Zionism didn’t flow from Empire. It rose from statelessness and persecution. Jews weren’t foreign to the land. They were of it, culturally, historically. And 1948 didn’t unfold in some colonial boardroom, it erupted in the ashes of empire and the chaos of war.

Call it tragic. Call it complex. But don’t stick a fancy label on it and call it something that it wasn’t. Don’t presume to know better than Israelis who they are and where they come from, and proceed to lecture them about it. Don’t distort what they tell you to fit your preferred narrative. 

Palestinians and Israelis have their own voices and they are valid, and important, and contradictory, and they matter. Afford them the dignity to listen when they tell you about who they are, and what they want. Not just the intellectual elites in the diaspora. But the voices of ordinary people, on the ground. 

When you deploy the settler-colonial framework to Israelis, you aren’t just arguing about history, you are failing to understand how they understand themselves. You are ignoring how they self-determine. And by doing so, you draw the wrong conclusions about how to engage with them effectively. If you persist in engaging people in terms they reject, you will only ever reach dead-ends.

Unless, of course, your goal isn’t understanding and resolution, but elimination, of one or the other, or both. And then the labels start to make a terrible kind of sense.

But it leads nowhere. Except back to the blood.


Post-scriptum: Post-1967 and when the analogy begins to fit

Now that I’ve probably pissed off friends and family on one side, let me risk pissing off friends and family on the other. In for a penny, in for a pound. Social isolation must be the fate I’m building for myself.

If the "settler-colonial" shoe doesn’t fit the founding of Israel, the concept begins to gain some traction after 1967. West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights came under Israeli control, a temporary measure, to ensure security, the world was told. Yet the occupation was never rolled back. Nor were those territories formally annexed with equal rights extended to all. The situation calcified. Settlements sprang up and started expanding. These were not refugee camps or revival villages, but state-subsidized enclaves, often built on contested or privately owned Palestinian land. Security was the stated rationale. Permanence was the apparent political goal. 

Inside these territories, two populations now live under two legal systems. One votes in Israeli elections; the other is governed by military law. Roads, permits, courts, property rights, everything bifurcated. The Palestinian Authority’s autonomy is fragmented, conditional, and ultimately subordinate to Israeli control. When a democracy behaves like a landlord with a favoured tenant, it invites precisely the colonial analogies it claims to refute. Trust erodes. Legitimacy frays.

I can already hear the objections: but Hamas! Terrorism! And yes, the failures of Palestinian leadership have ranged from tragic miscalculations to outright betrayal. Opportunities for negotiated compromise have been squandered. Civilians have been targeted alongside soldiers. Terrible war crimes have been committed. An angry, zero-sum politics has often prevailed where painful compromise might have been possible. But none of this justifies an endless occupation and the slow-motion annexation of territory. 

Zionism began as a movement for national self-determination. Post-1967 expansionism is something else entirely. It distorts the original vision into a kind of nationalist overreach that threatens Israel’s future. A people who returned to their homeland as survivors risk becoming rulers by habit and occupiers by inertia. If Israel continues down this path, as it is currently doing, the question won’t be whether it was a settler colony, but whether it has chosen to become one.

[For a more comprehensive treatment of both Israeli and Palestinian narratives, including structural critiques, see my earlier piece: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Beyond Traditional Narratives.]


Further Reading & References

  • Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist–Arab Conflict, 1881‑1999 (Vintage Books edition 2001)

  • Shafir, Gershon. Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli‑Palestinian Conflict, 1882‑1914 (1989)

  • Segev, Tom. One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate (2000)

  • Khalidi, Rashid. The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917‑2017 (2020)

  • Karsh, Efraim. Palestine Betrayed (2010)

  • Halevi, Yossi Klein. Letters to My Palestinian Neighbor (2018)

  • Yakobson, Alexander & Rubinstein, Amnon. Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation‑State and Human Rights (2008)